The upcoming issue of Education Next includes a fascinating article on the charter school explosion in post-Katrina New Orleans.  It’s not out just yet, but I can share a few tidbits.

Aside from the article’s unavoidable discussion of just how bad things were in New Orleans Public Schools, a few things stand out.  One was the pessimism and endemic dysfunction of the district, even after Katrina:

New Orleans mayor Ray Nagin announced that he would ask the governor for help in creating a citywide charter school system.  Nagin later explained that he had written a letter to Governor Kathleen Blanco on October 5: “Give me the charter schools I’ve been asking for—20 charter schools, a citywide charter school district.”  And on October 7…Governor Blanco issued several executive orders to smooth the way for charter schools in New Orleans. It was a measure of the school board’s intransigence that, despite a devastating hurricane, a $20 million grant, and a ton of political pressure, the…charter plan passed by only a 4–2 vote (with 1 abstention). (emphasis added)

Contrast that with the resilience of the local private schools:

In part because of its dismal public school system and in part because of a strong religious, especially Catholic, tradition, New Orleans had a robust private school network before Katrina: some 25,000 students, more than a third of the number in the public schools, attended 92 different schools. (Nationally, only 10 percent of K–12 students are enrolled in private schools.)  And their relative importance only increased after the storm.  By the first week of October, nearly 1,100 students were attending 2 Catholic schools in Algiers.  Soon after, the first 3 private schools opened their doors on the East Bank, and by early November, 8 of the city’s Catholic schools were open—all before a single public school, charter or not, had reopened anywhere in New Orleans.  Even after the public schools began operating, the private sector proved more nimble.  By the spring of 2006 there were nearly 20,000 students enrolled in private schools, three-quarters the prestorm figure, but well above the number that were back in public school.

When a disaster strikes, it’s pretty common for community organizations (churches, civic groups) to have a major hand, or even take the lead, in cleanup efforts.  So it shouldn’t be much of a surprise that the private system got up and running again much faster than the public schools.  And since post-disaster cleanup efforts are generally partnerships between the public and private sectors, neither should it be much of a surprise that the new district is a public/private fusion. 

But the partnership model breaks down when considering the district, which had to be dragged kicking and screaming nearly every step of the way to change.  Would Katrina have to have been Category 5 to make the district a little more favorable to reform?